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Case and Comment
EXPROPRIATION — VALUE — INJURIOUS AFFEC­
TION — SECTIONS 11-13, N. B. EXPROPRIATION ACT.
T h e  recent case of Charles H. Llewhjn and A. Ross Walker 
v. The Crown In The Right of The Province of New Brunswick' 
is of practical importance for future expropriation hearings. It 
also snows the inadequacies of certain provisions of the New 
Brunswick Expropriation A ct.2
T h e  Lieutenant-Governor in Council, pursuant to this Act, 
authorized the expropriation of a large tract of the claimants’ 
land in the C ity or Fredericton. T h e  purpose of the expropriation 
was the construction of the Trans-Canada highway. T h e claim ­
ants’ remaining land was completely severed by the highway. 
Approximately seven weeks after the order in council authorizing 
the expropriation was recorded in the Registry O ffice for the 
County of York, the Lieutenant-Governor in Council ordered 
that tfiis portion of the highway be designated as a controlled 
access hignway. Section 13B of the Highway A ct3 provides that 
no person shall, without first obtaining a permit from the M in­
ister:
(a) const n u t . use or allow the use of any private road, private 
entrance way or gate which, or any part of which, is connected 
or opens on a controlled access highway:
(b) sell or offer or expose for sale any vegetables, fru it, meat, 
fish or other produce or any goods, wares or merchandise 
upon or within one hundred and fifty feet of the limit of the 
controlled access highway; and
(c) place, erect or alter any building, structure or fence or anv 
part thereof or place any tree, shrub or hedge or any part 
thereof upon or within one hundred feet of any limit of a 
controlled access highway-*
T h e claimants, who were subdividers and contractors, claim ­
ed compensation on the basis of the land actually taken and 
damages for severance and the restricted use they could make of 
their remaining land. They were awarded compensation for the
1. Not reported.
2. R .S.N .B., 1952, c. 77.
3. R .S.N .B., I9.r»2, c. 103.
4. As enacted by (19.'».')) I Kli/. II. c. ">2. s. 2. as amended by (19'»/) 
7 F.liz. II , c. 41, s. 4.
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land taken and damages for severance, but the arbitrators were un­
animous in holding that they could not award compensation 
respecting the land injuriously affected by the highway being 
declared a controlled access highway. They said:
W hile ihe public work for the construction of which the acquis­
ition of the expropriated land was deemed necessary was the 
by-pass, there is no evidence before us ( f the existence, as of 
August 17. 1957.® of any likelihood that the by-pass would be 
declared a controlled access highway. T h at declaration was 
made seven weeks after the effective date of the expropriation.
T h e  by-pass could have been carried through to completion 
without an\ such declaration having been made. See I'lie King  
v. Hill in, (1944) S.C.R.
In Halin v. The King," the Crown expropriated a portion of the 
claim ant’s laud surrounding an airport to enlarge its runways.
I lie claimant sought compensation for the land taken and for 
damages alleged to have been caused1 to the remainder of his 
lands. T h e  damages resulted from certain orders in council and 
zoning regulations passed by the federal authorities setting re­
strictions on the height of buildings on land adjoining airports. 
It was held, however, that it was not the exoropriation that had 
injuriously affected the claim ant’s adjoining lana, but regulations 
passed' under another statute. Thus the claimant was not entitled 
to damages resulting to the residue of his property.
T h e decision in the instant ease is obviously of great prac­
tical importance when one considers the rapid expansion of high­
ways in this province and the desirability of having ccrtain por­
tions declared controlled acccss highways.
Also of interest is the method of assessing compensation to 
be awarded a claimant. In the instant ease the arbitrators follow­
ed the Halin case, but that case it should be observed was con­
cerned with the federal Expropriation Act, a statute that, unlike 
the New Brunswick statute, deals with compensation in general 
language. Under the federal statute compensation is made up of 
the value of the land actually taken and damages to any remain­
ing land.7 There is no set procedure in the Act for determining 
the value of the land actually taken, but the courts have evolved 
certain tests. Under these, tne value of the lands taken is to be 
determined as of the date of the expropriation. It  is the fair value 
to the owner of the land, not the value to the taker. Rumours of 
an intended expropriation and the public work often enhance the 
value of the land in that vicinity, but this enhancement is not
5. Date of recording of the order in council authorizing the expropria­
tion.
6. [19441 S.C.R. 119: [1944] 1 D .L .R . 625.
7. liv in g  Oil Co. I.Id. x>. T h e King  [1946] S.C.R. " d ;  [1946] 4 D .L .R . 62"*, 
per Kstev. J.
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to be taken into account in determining the value of the land 
taken. In Lucas and the Chesterfield Gas and Water Board,' it 
was said:
I hr <lci cases . . Ia\ down ltie piinciple that where lh>* 
special \alue exists only for the intended purchaser who ha* 
obtained powers of compulsory purchase it cannot be taken 
into consideration in fixing the price, bora use to do otherwise 
would l>e to allow the existence of the scheme to enhance the 
value of the lands to be purchased under it.
In Cedar Rapids Manufacturing and Power Company v. Lacoste,'* 
the Privy Council in discussing value to the owner states that the
. . . price must be tested by the imaginary market which would 
have ruled had the land been exposed for sale before any such 
undertakers had secured the powers. 01 acquired the othei 
subjects which made the undertaking as a whole a realized 
p< »ssibilitv.
T h e  public work, then, can neither diminish or enhance the value 
of the claimant’s land. However, in Sidney v. North F.astern Rail­
way,™ it was argued that land suitable for a reservoir mav have an 
enhanced value because only that land was suitable for a reservoir 
for any intending purchaser. In his judgment Rowlatt, J. said:
Hut the value to the owner is not confined to the value of 
the land to the owner for his own purposes; it includes the 
value which the requirem ents of other persons for other pur­
poses give to it as a m arketable rommoditv. provided that the 
existence of the scheme for which it is taken is not allowed to 
add to the \ alu e ."
Thus, the value of the land taken is to be determined before 
any scheme has been proposed, or ignoring the scheme and bear­
ing in mind that the land may have been bought for that parti­
cular purpose by other persons and enhanced bv anv normal 
increase in value up to the date of the actual recording of the 
order in council. Bearing these principles in mind, a good test 
to apply is: W h at would the owner as a prudent man at the 
m oment of expropriation pav for the property rather than be 
ejected from it?12
Are any of these principles affected by the New Brunswick 
Expropriation Act? T h e relevant sections read:
11. T h e  arbitrators shall appraise and determine the fair
value of each parcel o f the land as of the date of the recording
8. [1909] 1 K.B. 16. per Fletcher Moulton. I,. J.. at p. 31
9. [19141 A C . 569. at p. 570.
10. [1914] S K.R. 629.
11. Ib id ., at p. 636.
12. D ig g o ii-I lib brn  f  id. i'. T h e  kiu<i [1949] S C R .  712; [1949] 4 D .I..R .
785.
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of the Order in Council; and the owner or owners thereof shall 
be entitled to be paid the miiu awarded by the arbitrators, 
whose decision shall l>c final and not subject to appeal except 
(in a m atter of law.
12. T h e  arbitrators shall consider the advantage, as well as 
the disadvantage, of the public work as respects the land of 
any person through which the same passes, or to which it is 
contiguous or as regards any claim for compensation for dam 
ages caused thereby; and shall in assessing the value of any 
property taken or in awarding the am: unt of damages, take 
into consideration the advantages accrued or likely to accrue 
to such person or his estate, as well as the injury or damages 
occasioned by the public work.
13. I he arbitrators in awarding the amount to any claim ant 
for injury done to the land, and in estimating the am ount to 
be paid for lands taken shall assess the \alue thereof as at the 
time when the injury complained of was occasioned or the 
lands taken, and not according to the value of adjoining lands 
at the time of making the aw ard.'»
Sections 11 and 13 and the first portion of section 12 appear 
to codify the principles enunciated above, but the latter portion 
of section 12 appears to introduce a new principle. In part it says 
that the arbitrators shall, in assessing the value of any property 
taken or in awarding the amount of damages, take into consider­
ation the advantages accrued or likely to accrue to such person 
or his'estate, as well as the injury or damages occasioned oy the 
public works. Thus, the arbitrators in assessing the value of the 
land actually taken, must consider the advantages accrued or 
likely to accrue to such person, but only consider injuries already 
accrued. T h e  Act does not mention injuries or damages likely 
to accrue to such person.
Thus, at the date of the expropriation the arbitrators could 
come to the conclusion that the highway will be an advantage 
to the claimant in opening that area for development and reduce 
the assessment of the value of land taken accordingly. T his would 
be extremely unfair to the claimant, especially if at the date of 
the hearing the highway had already been deemed a controlled 
access highway. T h e arbitrators would not be able to take this into 
consideration since the value of the land is determined at the 
date of the recording of the order in council and this was not 
an injury already occasioned.
In the present case, although the evidence was not present­
ed from this point of view, the arbitrators were of the opinion 
that there was no enhancement because of the highway, but this 
might well be different under slightly altered circumstances, 
especially if the land was inaccessible from another existing high­
way. Hodgins, J. A. in Re Toronto and Hamilton Highway Com-
13. R .S.N .B .. I9*>2, c. 77.
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mission and Cvabbu  thought acccss to a highway was a benefit 
to a person or his estate and even thought there was an advantage 
gained by proximitv.
John W . Turnbull,
II Law, U .N .B.
BAILEES — POW ER OF SALE — LIENS — SECTIONS 
5 9, LIENS ON GOODS AND CHATTELS ACT — R.S.C. 
ORD. 50, R. 2.
T h e  purpose of this note is to discuss certain defects in the 
law regarding the rights of bailees to sell bailed property. T he 
facts of Sachs v. Miklos1 provide a convenient point o f  departure. 
In 1940 the defendant consented to store in her house furniture 
belonging to the plaintiff without making any charge for the 
servicc. fn 1943 the defendant required the room in which the 
furniture was stored. She obtained from the plaintiff’s bank 
manager an address where he might be found, wrote to him twice 
and attempted more than once to communicate with him by 
telephone. T h e letters having been returned to her, she sent the 
furniture to the second defendants, a firm of auctioneers, who 
sold it for CIS. In 1946 the plaintiff demanded the return of his 
furniture and then brought action. T h e  defendants, the bailee 
and the auctioneers, were both found liable in conversion be­
cause they were found not to be agents of necessity, since there 
was no emergency and the goods were not perishable.
At common law a bailee’s power of sale was restricted to 
situations of necessity and possibly only to carriers. Further, the 
power was limited to perishable goods and could only be exercised 
in the best interests of the owner, not of the bailee. In addition 
a real necessity had to exist for the sale and it had to be prac­
tically (commercially) impossible to get the owner’s instructions 
in time as to what should be done.2
Rccent statutes, however, have made provision giving powers 
of sale to certain bailees. Examples are the Inn-Keepers Act3 and 
the W arehousem an’s Lien Act.4 T h e Liens on Goods and C hat­
tels Act'’ contains more general provisions. It  first gives a lien to 
persons who have done work on chattels, jewellers, wharfingers 
and gratuitous bailees, and then provides a power of sale for these 
persons. T h e lien of the gratuitous bailee and the power of sale
1». ( I ‘M(i) 37 O .L .R . 636.
1. [1948] 2 K.R. 43.
2. Sims v. M idland Ily. [1913] I K.B. 103: f«»1 a discussion of agency of 
necessity, see Cheshire and Fifoot. T h e  Law of Contract (I9.16), 4th ed.. 
pp. 387-8.
3. R .S.N .B., 1952. c. I I I .  s. 2.
4. R .S.N .B., 19:72, c. 247. s. 4.
f). R .S.N .B., 19.12. c. 131. ss. 2. 3. 4. ;’> and 9.
